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INTRODUCTION
Privatisation has become a key instrument in the stabilisation and structural
adjustment programmes imposed on Africa by the Bretton Woods
institutions. It is an essential part of an overall strategy to open up African
economies to market forces and promote private sector development.
African governments are under considerable pressure from international
donors to seil public enterprises to domestic and foreign private capital,
especially since these enterprises are considered to have performed
dismally. Given their troubled economie conditions and acute dependence
on foreign financial flows, African governments have officially accepted
privatisation so as not to forfeit the international support crucial for their
political survival.
Several authors, however, have observed that the actual number of
privatisations has remained modest in Africa.' They point to vanous
technical and financial constraints as well as sociopolitical factors which
can explain this curious finding. Interestingly, some factors reflect the same
political concerns that had led to the creation of so many public enterprises
in the years after independence: inability to attract foreign investment to the
politically and economically unstable African nations, absence of a well-
developed domestic entrepreneurial class, and the pursuit of patron-client
relationships by African 'patrimonial' states.2 Another important factor is
the resistance to privatisation from civil society, in particular by professional
bodies, student organisations and trade unions, since privatisation often
involves the sale of public property to well-placed nationals or to foreign
enterprises and generally results in massive lay-offs of workers.
Surprisingly little attention has been devoted to regional Opposition to
privatisation. In this article I focus on regional Opposition in Cameroon
which arose after 15 July 1994, when the government was forced by
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international donors to announce the privatisation of 15 public enterprises,
notably in the transport and agro-industrial sectors. The most prominent
among them was the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC), founded
in 1946/47. The CDC is one of the oldest and by far the largest agro-
industrial parastatal in Cameroon. lts estates are located mainly in the
coastal areas of Anglophone Cameroon, and its immense contribution to
regional development has been highly valued by the regional population. I
will argue here that the virulent regional Opposition to the privatisation of
the CDC cannot be fully grasped without reference to what has come to be
called the 'Anglophone problem'. This problem poses a major challenge to
the efforts of the post-colonial state to forge 'national unity' and 'national
integration', and it has led to the reintroduction of 'federalism' and
'secession' into the national political discourse.
The root of the problem may be traced back to 1961, the birth of the
Federal Republic of Cameroon. This marked the reunification of two
territories which had undergone different colonial experiences after the First
World War, when the erstwhile German Kamerun Protectorate was
partitioned into French and British Mandate/Trust Territories. It also marked
the start of a unique experiment in federalism in Africa. However, federalism
in Cameroon turned out to be 'more shadow than reality'.1 Contrary to
Anglophone expectations, federalism did not create an equal partnership
between the two parties which could preserve the cultural heritage and
identity of the Anglophone minority. It proved a mere transitory phase in the
total integration of the Anglophone region into a strongly centralised, unitary
state. This gradually spawned an Anglophone consciousness: the feeling of
being 'marginalised', 'exploited' and 'assimilated' by the Francophone-
dominated state and by the Francophone population as a whole. Not until the
political liberalisation process of the early 1990s did parts of the Anglophone
elite begin openly organising in various associations and pressure groups to
protest against the subordinate position of the Anglophones and to put
forward claims for self-determination and autonomy. Although the major
Anglophone movements initially called for a return to the federal state, the
Biya government's persistent refusal to discuss such constitutional reforms
later forced them to adopt a secessionist stand.
The government announcement on 15 July 1994 of the CDC privatisation
was seen in Anglophone Cameroon as a further step in the dismantling of the
Anglophone colonial legacy by the Francophone-dominated state. As a
consequence, all regional parties, associations and pressure groups were
inclined to forget their differences and form a united front against any attempt
to seil the CDC to French or Francophone interests. One ethnic group in the
coastal area of Anglophone Cameroon, the Bakweri, was particularly
concerned with the announced privatisation of the corporation. Since they
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claimed ownership of the CDC lands, the Bakweri feit betrayed at not having
been previously consulted, and they warned the government that the CDC
could not be sold to non-natives without Bakweri consent.
PRIVATISATION OF THE CDC
Privatisation has been put forward by the international donors as one of the
magie formulas to eure the ailing Cameroonian economy. For many years,
the economy of Cameroon had been viewed as one of the rare success
stories in Africa. This was not without foundation: Cameroon's economie
performance was impressive, registering a phenomenal growth rate of 6-7
per cent during the period 1970-86." However, as Hugon was the first to
point out, this optimistic view tended to ignore certain weaknesses in the
domestic economy which constantly threatened the 'growth miracle' - in
particular the economy's almost total dependence on the export of
agricultural raw materials and, more recently, of oil.5 This particular
weakness became increasingly manifest from the mid-1980s onwards, when
the sharp fall in the prices of these commodities on the world market,
together with the 40 per cent depreciation of the US dollar relative to the
CFA franc, plunged the domestic economy into severe crisis. This Situation
was worsened by large-scale mismanagement, embezzlement and capital
flight estimated at FCFA 150 billion a year - one-quarter of the annual
national budget. Apparently the much-trumpeted slogans of 'rigour and
moralisation' which Paul Biya had coined on succeeding Ahmadou Ahidjo
as president in 1982 had been nothing more than hollow phrases. After
some procrastination, the government was forced to adopt a structural
adjustment plan (SAP) in 1988/89, containing such conventional
prescriptions as big cuts in public expenditures, increased state revenues,
privatisation and thoroughgoing liberalisation.6
At the start of the economie crisis, there were some 175 public
enterprises in the country, employing around 80,000 people. A considerable
number of agro-industrial parastatals had been created or expanded after
independence with the aid of international donors.7 These public enterprises
served both economie and political ends. Besides being potential avenues to
economie modernisation and growth, they allowed the government to
engage in prebendal politics and to cement a 'hegemonie alliance',
incorporating the country's emerging elite into the state apparatus." A
'patrimonial logic' existed in many African post-colonial states, but it was
particularly forceful in Cameroon, a country with stark ethnic and regional
cleavages. It is beyond any doubt that this logic contributed to the poor
performance of most public and para-public enterprises.9 Prior to the
economie crisis, the Cameroonian government was subsidising parastatal
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sector losses to the tune of some 150 billion CFA francs a year. Though
many of the oil revenues were initially kept in secret bank accounts abroad,
their primary function soon became the covering of parastatal deficits.
From the very start of the economie crisis, the World Bank made
parastatal reform a cornerstone of its lending conditions. Given the growing
budgetary constraints, the Biya government officially agreed to co-operate.
In May 1987 it appointed a national commission to recommend reform
measures for the parastatal sector. One year later the commission reported
back to the president, having determined which institutions should be
liquidated, sold to the private sector or rehabilitated. However, few public
enterprises were effectively privatised, only six between 1988 and 1994.'°
Van de Walle has offered the following reasons for the slow pace of
privatisations:
Although the government is proceeding with care on the politically
sensitive issue of lay-offs, this does not appear to be the major
constraint on rapid implementation of the reform agenda. Rather,
intra-elite competition and haggling over the rents freed up by
privatisation, along with the lack of technical expertise within the
state, served to slow down the process of institutional reform."
Dissatisfied with the government's performance, the World Bank threatened
in early 1994 to suspend a credit of US$75 million to Cameroon if the
government did not accelerate the process of privatisation. Subsequently, on
15 July ofthat year, the government announced the privatisation of 15 large
public enterprises. Five agro-industrial parastatals were among them,
including the CDC. For various reasons, the announced privatisation of the
CDC brought on great commotion in the country, particularly in
Anglophone regions.
The CDC is the largest agro-industrial enterprise in the country. It is the
second largest employer of labour, surpassed only by the government. It
formerly employed 25,000 workers. At present, it still engages about 14,000
permanent workers and a few thousand seasonal and casual workers. It is
one of the few agro-industrial enterprises in the world that specialises in a
variety of crops, its four major ones being rubber, palm oil, tea and bananas.
Following independence and reunification in 1961, the Corporation
expanded its cultivated area from 20,000 to 40,000 hectares, with the help
of huge loans from several well-known financial institutions, including the
World Bank, the International Development Association (IDA), the
European Development Fund (FED), the Commonwealth Development
Corporation (COMDEV) and the (French) Central Fund for Economie Co-
operation (CCCE).
The CDC is, furthermore, one of the country's oldest enterprises. lts
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history is closely linked with the political and economie history of
Anglophone Cameroon. It was founded in 1946, but its roots can be traced
back to the German colonial period (1884-1914).12 During that period many
large-scale private plantations were created on the fertile, volcanic soils
around Mount Cameroon in the coastal area of the present Anglophone
Cameroon. The establishment of a plantation economy in the region led to
the expulsion of the original occupants of the land, notably the Bakweri,
into prescribed native reserves.11 With the British occupation in 1914/15, the
property of the German planters was confiscated and turned over to the
Custodian of Enemy Property. When, shortly afterwards, the British took
over the administration of the area, the plantations were merged and a
government department was formed to manage them. By 1922, however,
the British Mandate Authority had already decided to get rid of them, as the
administrative costs of maintaining them were said to be prohibitive. It then
seriously considered returning the plantation lands to the original owners,
but in the end it dropped the idea. Instead, it came to the conclusion that it
would be in the best interest of the territory and its inhabitants to turn the
plantations back into the hands of foreign private enterprise. At an auction
held in London in November 1924, almost all the estates were bought by the
former German owners.
At the start of World War Two, the German estates were again
expropriated by the Custodian of Enemy Property; after the war, a decision
had to be reached once more on how to dispose of the properties. The
educated Bakweri elite, organised in the so-called Bakweri Land Committee,
immediately began agitating for the retrieval of its ancestral lands. It sent
several petitions, first to the British Crown, and subsequently to the United
Nations, as Britain had assumed responsibility for administration of the
territory under United Nations Trusteeship after the war. However, after
considerable deliberations, the British Trusteeship Authority declined once
again to surrender the ex-German plantation lands to the original owners.
Instead, it announced in November 1946 that they would be leased to a newly
established statutory corporation, the Cameroon Development Corporation
(CDC).
This corporation came into being with the passage of two ordinances in
December 1946. The first of these, the Ex-Enemy Lands (Cameroons)
Ordinance No. 38 (1946), provided for the acquisition of the ex-German
plantation lands which had been vested in the Custodian of Enemy Property
for the duration of World War Two. Under the terms of this ordinance, the
Governor of Nigeria, responsible for the administration of British
Cameroons, was to declare them 'native lands' and hold them in trust for the
common benefit of all the inhabitants of the territory. The second ordinance,
the Cameroons Development Corporation Ordinance No. 39 (1946),
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provided for the setting up of the Corporation. All the lands acquired by the
governor under the first ordinance were to be leased to this Corporation for
a period of 60 years. Significantly, the corporation was charged with a
doublé responsibility: it was to develop and manage the approximately
100,000 hectares of estate lands in the interests of the people of the Trust
Territory, and it was to provide for the spiritual, educational and social
welfare of its employees. After fulfilling all its obligations, the corporation
was to pay direct taxes to the Government of Nigeria and all profits were to
be used for the benefit of the people of the Trust Territory.
The CDC was of great importance to regional development. Some
students of plantation agriculture, such as Beckford,14 have blamed the
persistent poverty and underdevelopment of Third World economies on this
mode of production. In the case of the CDC, however, this thesis finds little
support. The corporation has been a major instrument of modernisation and
is largely credited with whatever socioeconomic development has occurred
in Anglophone Cameroon. It has created employment for many men and
women. It has constructed numerous roads. It has supplied water and
electncity. It has built and staffed schools. It has awarded a substantial
number of scholarships. It has provided medical care for a large proportion
of the local population. It has stimulated the supply of goods and services to
itself and its workers. And it has played a key role in the commercialisation
and modernisation of peasant production, as an intermediary in marketing
the Bakwen peasantry's banana production in the 1950s and in the
establishment of regional srnallholders' oil palm and rubber schemes from
the early 1960s.15 As a result, the CDC has often been called the economie
lifeline of Anglophone Cameroon.
The government announcement of the pnvatisation of this important
agro-industrial enterprise was all the more shocking to the Anglophone
population since the CDC (i) had been one of the rare public enterprises in
Cameroon to perform relatively well until the economie crisis, (ii) had been
able to survive the crisis mainly because the management and the workers
had agreed to adopt a series of drastic adjustment measures, and (iii) was on
the way to economie recovery following the 50 per cent devaluation of the
CFA franc in early 1994.
From its inception, the CDC has generally yielded positive results,
though these fluctuated over the years. In the three years preceding the crisis
(1983/84-1985/86), the corporation was still making substantial profits,
totalling FCFA 3.2 billion. The crisis, however, had a dramatic impact on
the corporation's financial Situation: during the period 1986/87-1990/91 it
suffered a loss of about FCFA 18 billion. Evidently the sharp fall in
commodity prices on the world market was the principal cause of the near
bankruptcy of the corporation. Nevertheless, other factors also contributed
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to the emergence and continuation of the crisis. First, there was the political
elite's inability or unwillingness to control the import of cheap tea and palm
oil, which impeded CDC sales on the domestic market. Second, there have
been frequent reports of involvement by the managerial elite in massive
embezzlement, reckless expenditure, waste and struggles for power often
based on ethnic and regional considerations. Managerial problems were
aggravated by the fact that the government was no longer prepared to render
financial assistance to the ailing parastatal during the crisis. To save the
Company from total collapse, the management and the trade unions on the
CDC estates agreed to adopt a series of adjustment measures aimed at cost
reduction and productivity increase. On 23 August 1987 the union
presidents agreed with management on a substantial increase in the
productivity to be required of estate workers. For example, the daily quota
required from tea pickers was raised from 26 to 32 kilograms of green
leaves. As the corporation's financial position continued to deteriorate,
management proposed further austerity measures to the union presidents.
Following negotiations, a new agreement was signed on 6 January 1990,
which entailed drastic cuts in the salaries and fringe benefits of all workers
and managerial staff, amounting to some 30 to 40 per cent of their previous
incomes. The corporation formerly supplied the workers with free housing,
water, electricity and medical facilities; henceforth they would be obliged to
make substantial contributions towards these services. The most draconian
measure, however, was the introduction of a compulsory savings scheme,
forcing the workers to save at least 15 per cent of their basic wages and
salaries for the corporation's recovery.'6
This managerial strategy for economie recovery was reinforced in
1989/90. The IMF- and World Bank-inspired SAP obliged the CDC
management to sign a four-year performance contract (1989/90-1993/94)
with the government, stipulating that the corporation was to achieve a set of
objectives relating to plantation management, production costs, quantity
and quality of output, and personnel productivity. In return, the government
was to write off some of the corporation's debts amounting to FCFA nine
billion and to exempt it from pay ment of certain taxes. The various
adjustment measures did bring some relief to the company's liquidity
problems but, owing to the contmuing decline in commodity prices, its
existence remained precarious. It was not until early 1994 that any bright
prospects for economie recovery appeared. The devaluation of the CFA
franc made CDC products more competitive on the world market. Then, a
few months later, the government surprisingly announced privatisation of
the corporation, which prompted vehement protest actions in Anglophone
Cameroon.
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THE 'ANGLOPHONE PROBLEM'
The intense Opposition in Anglophone Cameroon to the announced
privatisation of the CDC can only be fully understood within the wider
political context of what has been called the 'Anglophone problem'.17 This
problem emerged after the political elites of two territories with different
colonial legacies - one French and the other Bntish - had agreed in 1961 on
the formation of a federal state. Anglophone expectations that federalism
would create equal partnership proved unrealistic. During negotiations on
the federal constitution, notably at the Foumban Conference from 17 to 22
July 1961, it had already been evident that the bargaining power of the
Francophone delegation was far greater than that of the Anglophones.
Compared to the Francophone region, the size and population of the
Anglophone region was small, comprising only nine per cent of the area and
about a quarter of the total population of the federation. Even more
important, by the time of these negotiations the former French Trust
Territory of Cameroon was already an independent state, having been
renamed the Republic of Cameroon, while the British Trust Territory of
Southern Cameroons was, under the terms of the 1961 United Nations
plebiscite, still to achieve its independence by joining the sovereign
Republic of Cameroon. Capitalising on his territory's 'senior' status,
Ahmadou Ahidjo, the then Prime Minister of the Republic of Cameroon and
leader of the Francophone delegation, was able to dictate the terms for
federation. Although John Ngu Foncha, the then Prime Minister of Southern
Cameroons and leader of the Anglophone delegation, had proposed a loose
form of federalism, which hè regarded as a guarantee for preservation of the
cultural heritage and identity of the Anglophone minority, Ahidjo
eventually forced him to accept a highly centralised form of federalism.
Ahidjo, who was to become the President of the Federal Republic of
Cameroon, looked upon federalism merely as an unavoidable transitory
phase in the total integration of the Anglophone minority into a strongly
centralised, unitary state. To achieve this objective, hè employed several
tactics. One was to play off Anglophone political factions against each other
and eventually integrale them into a single party, the Cameroon National
Union (CNU). Another was to eliminate from positions of power any
Anglophone leaders who remained committed to federalism, replacing them
by others who favoured a unitary state. Still another tactic was to create
'clients' among the Anglophone elite. By granting top posts in the federal
institutions and in the single party to representatives of significant ethnic
and regional groups in the Anglophone region, hè tried to control these
groups. Finally, hè did not shrink from repressing any Opposition. Through
these and other tactics he succeeded in abohshing the federation on 20 May
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1972. His justification for this 'glorious revolution' was that federalism
fostered regionalism and impeded economie development.
A growing number of the Anglophone elite, however, were inclined to
attribute the emergence of 'regionalism' and lack of economie development
not to federalism per se, but rather to the hegemonie tendencies of the
Francophone-dominated state. They began complaining of the loss of regional
autonomy and the subordinate position of the Anglophone minority in the
unitary state. Their numerous grievances were mainly political, economie and
cultural. In particular these concerned their under-representation and their
inferior role in the national decision-making councils, the neglect of the
region's infrastructure and the exploitaü'on of its rieh economie resources,
especially oil, and the attempts at 'Frenchifïcation'.18
To reduce the danger of any united Anglophone action against the
Francophone-dominated state, Ahidjo decided after the 'glorious
revolution' of 20 May 1972 to divide the Anglophone territory into two
provinces, the South-West and North-West Provinces. In making his
decision he was well aware of the internal contradictions within the
Anglophone community between the coastal/forest people (the South West
Province) and the Grassfïeld people (the North-West Province). One of the
major reasons for these internal conflicts was the transfer of political power
from the south-west to the norm-west elite at the end of the 1950s.
Following this transfer, the north-west elite began asserting its presence. It
soon became ubiquitous in the higher levels of government and in high non-
governmental positions. In pre-empting for itself the choicest jobs as well
as the best lands in the south-west, it provoked strong resentment among
south-westerners to north-west domination.1" South-west sentiments were
mtensified by the fact that the 'entrepreneurial' north-westerners have
gradually succeeded in dommating most sectors of the south-west economy,
particularly trade, transport and housing.20 Another source of the south-
west-north-west divide was the UN plebiscite of 1961: on that occasion, the
south-west had shown considerable sympathy for alignment with Nigeria,
but the choice for Cameroon prevailed, mainly on the strength of the north-
west votes. A final source of tensions was the massive labour migration
from the north-west to the south-western plantations and the subsequent
settlement of north-western workers in the south-west.
Lack of unity and severe repression precluded the Anglophone elite
from openly expressing its grievances about Francophone domination until
1982, when Biya took power. Following the limited degree of liberalisation
introduced by the new president, Anglophones began voicing their long-
standing grievances. They strongly protested when the Biya government in
1984 changed the country's official name from 'United Republic of
Cameroon' to simply 'Republic of Cameroon'. They recalled that the new
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name was the same as the one Ahidjo had given to independent Francophone
Cameroon before reunification. Regional tensions in Anglophone Cameroon
were fuelled when it became clear that the president's ethnic group, the Beti,
were increasingly monopolising political and economie power. Like his
predecessor, Biya attempted to divide the Anglophones. One of his
strategies was to replace north-westerners, who held key positions in the
south-west, by south-westerners.
Given the Anglophone frustration with the Francophone-dominated
state, it was not surprising that the first Opposition party in the country was
formed in Anglophone Cameroon. In 1990 the Social Democratie Front
(SDF) was founded at Bamenda, the capital of the North West Province. lts
chairman was John Fru Ndi, a librarian by profession, who was to achieve
great popularity among the urban masses because of his great courage and
populist style of leadership. lts massive launching rally on 26 May 1990
ended in the killing of six young Anglophones by government troops.
Under considerable internal and external pressure, the Biya government
eventually introduced a larger measure of political liberalisation. In December
1990 it announced multi-partyism as well as a certain degree of freedom of
mass communication, association and holding of public meetings and
demonstration. As a result, one could observe the establishment of several
political parties, associations and pressure groups, and private newspapers in
Anglophone Cameroon, which began to express and represent Anglophone
interests. The SDF then spread its influence from the North West Province to
the South West Province, soon becoming the major Opposition party in
Anglophone Cameroon. However, it proved far more populär in the north-
west than in the south-west, as the south-west elite continued to be suspicious
of the aspirations of the predominantly north-western party leadership, fearing
renewed north-west domination. Personal animosities, on the other hand,
prevented the south-west elite from forming a strong south-western party. For
some time the SDF was instrumental in turning the Anglophone region into
one of the hot-beds of rebellion in the country, organising several fierce
confrontations with the regime in power, especially in the 1991 'ghost town'
campaign.21 Paradoxically, despite its great contribution to Anglophone
consciousness and action, the party began presenting itself as a 'national'
rather than an 'Anglophone' party, evidenced by its growing Francophone
membership. Henceforth, Anglophone interests would be represented first
and foremost by several newly created Anglophone associations and pressure
groups. Some of these, such as the Free West Cameroon Movement (FWCM)
and the Ambazonia Movement of Fon Gorji Dinka, advocated outright
secession. Most, however, initially championed a return to the federal state,
the major ones being the Cameroon Anglophone Movement (CAM) and the
All Anglophone Congress (AAC).
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These Anglophone associations and pressure groups have regularly
organised demonstrations, strikes and boycotts in their struggles against the
Francophone-dominated unitary state. The participation of various strata of
the Anglophone population in these actions demonstrates that the
'Anglophone problem' can no longer be perceived as simply and solely an
elitist problem. Interestingly, the actions are directed partly against the
discourses, myths and symbols produced by the unitary state. Anglophone
movements have boycotted the celebration of the national holiday on 20
May, the 'day of the 1972 glorieus revolution', declaring it a 'day of
mourning'. They called upon Anglophones to celebrate their own holidays
instead, namely the 'day of independence' on l October and the 'day of the
plebiscite' on 11 February. On these days there have been attempts by CAM
activists to hoist the federation flag. This challenge was answered by the
regime with extreme brutality. In addition, the Anglophone movements
have begun referring to Anglophone Cameroon as the 'Southern
Cameroons', the name of the territory during the British Trusteeship. The
reintroduction of this name serves at least two purposes. First, these
movements allege that the union between Anglophone and Francophone
Cameroon has proceeded without any constitutional base, because the
proper procedures for the enactment and amendment of the federal
constitution were not followed by Ahidjo. In this perspective, Anglophone
Cameroon still finds itself in the pre-reunification phase as the Trust
Territory of the Southern Cameroons. Consequently, the United Nations
should shoulder its political responsibility for this territory and condemn the
'annexation of the Southern Cameroons' by the Republic of Cameroon. The
hoisting of the United Nations flag in Anglophone Cameroon in recent years
is a symbol of the Anglophone belief in the continuing responsibility of the
United Nations for the Southern Cameroons. A second purpose of the
reintroduction of the name Southern Cameroons is to lay a historical and
geographical foundation for Anglophone identity.
Confronted with the Biya government's persistent refusal to discuss a
return to the federal state, Anglophone movements declared the 'zero
Option' in 1993/94, total independence for the Southern Cameroons. They
have since engaged in a diplomatic offensive to gain international support
for the Anglophone cause. This offensive has focused particularly on the
United Nations and the Commonwealth.22
Missions to the United Nations undertaken by members of the
Anglophone Standing Committee of the AAC and the newly created
Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) to seek support for the
Anglophone struggles for a return to the federal state or for secession have
generaled wide publicity for the Anglophone cause, but have failed to yield
any tangible results. The Anglophone Standing Committee and the SCNC
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have also done their utmost to prevent the Republic of Cameroon from being
admitted into the Commonwealth. The Biya government applied for
membership in 1989. It hoped that Commonwealth membership would
create new political and economie openings outside the French sphere of
influence and help improve its strained relationship with the Anglophone
community. The latter proved to be wishful thinking, however. The
Anglophone movements made strong appeals to Commonwealth members to
reject the application of the Republic of Cameroon, drawing attention to the
Biya government's persistent oppression of the Anglophone minority. The
Commonwealth was asked instead to seriously consider granting the
Southern Cameroons either füll membership or a special status in the
Organisation, for the Southern Cameroons was more likely to meet the
historical and linguistic conditions for admission than was the Republic of
Cameroon. Eventually, the Anglophone campaign failed. Although the
Republic of Cameroon did not yet fulfil the conditions for Commonwealth
membership stipulated in the 1991 Harare Declaration - the establishment of
a democratie system, good governance and respect for human rights - it was
nevertheless admitted to the Commonwealth on l November 1995. Most
Commonwealth members argued that Cameroon's admission would bring
pressure to bear upon the Biya government to introducé political reforms. It
is noteworthy that their argument has been supported by the chairman of the
SDF, John Fru Ndi. SCNC leaders feit frustrated, however. They now appear
to have developed a new strategy. At the November 1995 Commonwealth
summit at Auckland in New Zealand, their delegation pleaded for a Quebec-
style referendum for the Southern Cameroons and filed an application for a
separate Southern Cameroons membership of the Commonwealth.
The SCNC has set l October 1996 as the date for the declaration of
independence of the Southern Cameroons. The chances of international
recognition of an independent Southern Cameroons state remain slim, but the
SCNC is hopeful that its diplomatic offensive will at least raise international
awareness to the point where military intervention by the Biya regime upon
the declaration of independence will be difficult. Nevertheless, the SCNC
does not rule out the possibility of a 'long-drawn war' and is therefore
considering the creation of a 'defensive force' in the Southern Cameroons.21
ANGLOPHONE OPPOSITION TO THE PRIVATISATION OF THE CDC
During the economie crisis there were frequent rumours in Anglophone
Cameroon that the Biya government wished to privatise the CDC and seil it
to French or Francophone enterprises. Although the government strongly
denied such rumours, Anglophones remained on the alert, ready to act if
their regional patrimony was threatened. This is a clear sign that they had
lost all faith in the corrupt, authoritarian regime and were not prepared to
tolerate any further attempts by the Francophone-dominated state to
dismantle their cultural and economie heritage. They were particularly
determined to keep control over the CDC, the pride and economie lifeline
of Anglophone Cameroon.
In June 1992, for instance, it was rumoured that the French were
interested in taking over the Corporation. This occurred after the Biya
government, highly dependent on French support and aid, had managed to
obtain a FCFA seven billion low-interest loan for the ailing Company from
the French CCCE. Although mis loan provided much-needed capital for
investment purposes, the increased control by France over the corporation
was highly resented by CDC workers and managers, as well as by the wider
public in Anglophone Cameroon. It was then reported in Anglophone
newspapers that the CCCE wanted to take over the CDC oil palm estates,
again resulting in widespread protests in Anglophone Cameroon.
This outcry against expanded French control over the corporation
sharply contrasted with Anglophone sentiments regarding previous and
later transfers of the management of two major CDC crops to Anglo-
American companies. Few protests were voiced in Anglophone Cameroon
when the corporation entrusted management of the banana sector to the
American multinational, Del Monte, in 1987. And Anglophone newspapers
even lauded the agreement between the CDC and (the British) COMDEV in
late 1992 which stipulated that management of the corporation's three tea
estates be transferred to COMDEV for a period of ten years. Anglophones
argued that these two Anglo-American companies had wide experience in
plantation management. COMDEV even had such experience in Anglophone
Cameroon, having satisfactorily managed the CDC from 1960 to 1974.24
Above all, Anglophones strongly believed that Anglo-American companies
would be less inclined than French ones to dominate and exploit an
Anglophone region and that their business culture fitted in well in
Anglophone Cameroon.
When the government finally did announce the privatisation of the CDC
on 15 July 1995, Anglophones were deeply incensed. All existing parties,
associations and pressure groups in Anglophone Cameroon formed a united
front to resist the government's decision. They claimed that the privatisation
of the CDC was unjustifiable for various reasons.
First, the CDC was one of the few remaining large-scale enterprises in
Anglophone Cameroon. All other regional enterprises, such as the West
Cameroon Electricity Corporation (POWERCAM), the Cameroon Bank,
the West Cameroon Development Agency and the West Cameroon Produce
Marketing Board, had been systematically dissolved by the Francophone-
dominated state after reunification.
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Second, the CDC was a unique enterprise in Cameroon and the
economie lifeline of Anglophone Cameroon. From its inception, the
corporation had been oriented not only to capital accumulation, but also to
regional development. One Anglophone columnist, Mr Jing Thomas,
captured the essence of what the CDC means for Anglophones:
The CDC is unlike any other corporation. It means native lands,
especially those of the Bakweri. It means jobs for Cameroonians,
especially the Anglophones. It is a symbol of Anglophone survival
against all odds ... If the CDC falls ... the last act of internal
colonisation would have been completed.25
Third, unlike many other Cameroonian public enterprises, the CDC had
always performed rather well up to the economie crisis. Moreover, the
announcement of privatisation came at a time when there were bright
prospects for the corporation's economie recovery following devaluation of
the CFA franc.
Fourth, in accordance with the agreement between the management and
the unions in 1990, the workers had injected FCFA 5.5 billion into the
corporation as compulsory savings during the crisis. Therefore, the CDC
could not be privatised without Consulting the unions and workers.
Anglophones once again alleged that privatisation of the CDC was 'an
ill-disguised plot to hand over the corporation to the French and the
Francophones' or 'a plan of Biya to compensate his "tribesmen" and allies
with a slice of the parastatal cake'.26 There were protest marches in the
Anglophone towns organised by the SDF and Anglophone movements.
Protesters carried banners with slogans such as 'France: hands off
Anglophones' and 'Hands off or we will burn the plantations'. On 30-31
July 1994, the CAM National Executive met, condemning the privatisation
of the CDC as a declaration of war against the people of Southern
Cameroons and calling upon Anglophones to observe 16 August as a day of
protest and solidarity with the CDC.27 In August, the Biya government sent
a delegation composed of high-ranking Anglophone allies to the capitals of
the two Anglophone provinces to try to calm the population. They were
jeered and asked whether they would 'benefit of the spoils'.
The Bakweri, whose lands had been expropriated under German
colonial rule and later leased to the CDC in 1946 for a term of 60 years, feit
particularly aggrieved by the announced privatisation of the CDC. On 23
July 1994, the Bakweri chiefs and elite met at Buea, under the chairmanship
of Paramount Chief S.M.L. Endeley of Buea and Paramount Chief F. Bille
Manga Williams of Victoria, to discuss the implications of the government
decision. They agreed to oppose the announced privatisation strongly, on
the grounds that the CDC lands were Bakweri lands and thus could not be
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sold to non-natives without Bakweri consent. After some lengthy and
passionate discussions, an ad hoc committee was elected by acclamation
which was to préparé a detailed memorandum on the Bakweri position to be
presented to the government and all other interested parties.28
On 4 August 1994, over 500 Bakweri elite and notables gathered at the
Buea Youth Cultural and Animation Center approved the memorandum
drawn up by the ad hoc committee. They later presented it to the Provincial
Governor for onward transmission to President Biya. On the same day,
Professor Ndiva Kofele-Kale, secretary of the ad hoc committee, was
designated counsel for the Bakweri people with instructions to present their
case before the United Nations and other international fora.
The Bakweri case was supported emphatically by the Anglophone
movements. A strongly worded petition to the Head of State, co-signed by
the Anglophone pressure groups and the Bakweri chiefs, reiterated that the
Bakweri had never relinquished ownership of the CDC lands and that the
corporation could not be sold without Bakweri consent. It also pointed out
that the Bakweri had never been paid royalties for the use of their lands
since 1946.
Concerned about the mounting anger within the Bakweri community,
the Biya government sent the above-mentioned delegation of its
Anglophone allies to Buea to discuss the issue with Bakweri
representatives. The delegation was led by Chief Ephraim Inoni, Deputy
Secretary General at the Presidency and chief of Bakingili, a village located
in the territory of a Bakweri subgroup. Though speaking on behalf of the
government, hè appealed to the Bakweri representatives not to forget that hè
was one of them. He acknowledged that there should have been prior
contact between the government and the Bakweri before the announcement
of the corporation's privatisation. He denied the widespread rumours in
Anglophone Cameroon that the French and some high-ranking
Francophones had masterminded the whole Operation. While admitting that
the financial Situation of the CDC had improved after devaluation of the
CFA franc, hè argued that privatisation would enable the corporation to
obtain new capital for the necessary investments in production and
processing. The Bakweri Paramount Chief, S.M.L. Endeley, then took the
floor. Amid thunderous applause hè declared that the Bakweri were against
privatisation of the CDC and requested Chief Inoni to report this to
President Biya:
We are in a country where we like to cheat ourselves, where
government hands down decisions through dictatorship ... We say no,
no [to privatisation], go and teil Mr Biya that hè cannot afford to go
down in history as the man who sold the CDC.29
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After the delegation had returned to Yaoundé, the government took no
further action on the privatisation of the CDC. By the end of 1995, it was
rumoured that COMDEV had shown interest in taking over the Corporation.
It is beyond doubt that a takeover by this renowned British Corporation
would be acceptable to Anglophones. Nevertheless, they would still expect
COMDEV to negotiate with the Bakweri, the landowners, especially
because the 60-year CDC lease will expire in 2007. Apparently the Bakweri
are not inclined at present to renew the lease and are organising to reclaim
the CDC lands after it expires.10
CONCLUSION
This study has highlighted the virulent resistance in Anglophone Cameroon
to the government announcement of the privatisation of the CDC. It would
be wrong to conclude from this Opposition that Anglophones are against
privatisation per se. In fact, privatisation of poorly performing public
enterprises has been laid down in the programmes of most Anglophone
parties, including the SDF. The petition to the Head of State, co-signed by
the Anglophone pressure groups and Bakweri chiefs, also stated that
in principle, the Bakweri and other Anglophones have no quarrel with
the idea of privatisation or sale of companies in which government
enjoys majority control since we fully understand the logic behind
such an exercise, i.e. the relocation of the management of inefficiently
managed parastatals in more efficiënt hands. We recognise that
government, as the controlling shareholder in these companies, has an
Obligation to the majority shareholders and the Cameroonian taxpayer
to ensure that their tax revenues are not wasted in failing parastatals.11
I have argued in this study that the strong resistance of Anglophones in
general and the Bakweri in particular can only be fully understood in the
context of the 'Anglophone problem'. Privatisation of the CDC was
perceived as a further step by the Francophone-dominated state towards
destruction of the Anglophone cultural and economie heritage. This
perception was strengthened by the fact that the CDC has the reputation of
being one of the rare parastatals in Cameroon which from its inception has
played a significant role in regional development and which had a relatively
good performance record until the economie crisis. Moreover, the Bakweri,
the owners of the CDC lands, were never consulted.
The Biya government has devised various strategies to cope with the
'Anglophone problem'. It has often tried to ignore or to minimise the
Anglophone-Francophone divide, with reference to the unique Cameroonian
colonial and post-colonial experience. Biya himself and other government
officials have regularly told the Cameroonian public that 'there was no
Anglophone-Francophone divide during the German colonial era' and that
'Cameroon is at present a bilingual and multi-cultural nation, which is a safe
guarantee for the preservation of the differential linguistic and cultural
heritage of the post-German colonial era'.
In reply to the Anglophone demand for a return to the federal state, the
Biya government has often stressed that the unitary state has been the result
of the massive vote of the Cameroonian people voluntarily expressed during
the 1972 referendum. Like Ahidjo, Biya has claimed that a unitary state is
to be preferred over a federal state in the Cameroonian Situation. A federal
state tends to be costly, weak as far as state power is concerned, and
divisive, provoking ethnic and regional sentiments rather than a national
consciousness. While hè has constantly declined to discuss a return to the
federal state - the so-called two-state Option - he appears willing to concede
to a certain degree of decentralisation within the unitary state - the so-called
ten-state option based on the current ten provinces in Cameroon.
The Biya government has also attempted to divide the Anglophones,
capitalising on existing contradictions between the south-west and north-
west elite. One of Biya's divisive tactics is to appoint south-westerners to
key positions in the south-west, in response to frequent complaints of south-
westerners about north-western domination over their province. Another
tactic is to use his allies in the Anglophone community for the defence of
the unitary state, providing them with an adequate reward for their loyal
services. Paradoxically, the 'Anglophone problem' has enhanced the
chances of Biya loyalists among the Anglophone elite to be appointed to
government posts which used to be reserved for Francophones. Obviously,
Biya's decision to enhance the position of Anglophones in the state
apparatus is a strategy to belie charges that Anglophones only play second
fïddle in the Francophone-dominated unitary state and, simultaneously, to
attract new members of the Anglophone elite into the 'hegemonie alliance'.
Such highly placed Anglophones tend to be members of the Anglophone
delegations sent regularly by Biya from Yaoundé to the Anglophone
provinces to contest the claims of the leadership of the Anglophone
movements and to defend the unitary state.
Another strategy is to cool off the mounting Anglophone Opposition.
The CDC privatisation case clearly shows that Biya has tried to placate the
Anglophone community. He first sent an Anglophone delegation to explain
government policies and investigate Anglophone and Bakweri grievances.
Subsequently, hè postponed the privatisation of the CDC indefinitely. He
now seems inclined to hand over the Corporation to the British COMDEV
rather than to prospective French and Francophone buyers.
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Last, but not least, the Biya government continues to rely on a strategy
of repression. Leaders of the Anglophone movements are regularly harassed
by security forces, threatened with arrest, and subjected to travelling
restrictions. Repression even seems to have been intensified in the wake of
Anglophone threats to proclaim an independent Southern Cameroons state.
The privatisation protest movement is one of the recent developments in
Anglophone Cameroon which have made the Biya regime painfully aware
of the growing unity and determination among the Anglophones in their
struggle for redress of the marginalisation and Subordination of their region
within the Francophone-dominated state. The regime nevertheless refuses to
negotiate with the Anglophone leaders. lts arrogant denial of any
'Anglophone problem' and its resolve to defend the unitary state by all
available means could lead to an escalation of Anglophone demands past a
point of no return.
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Relationship Between the State and Civil
Society in the Zimbabwean Elections 1995
LIISA LAAKSO
The general elections in Zimbabwe, on 8 and 9 April 1995, were conducted
in a more peaceful and regulated manner than ever before. Unfortunately, the
progress in the practical arrangements of the polling was accompanied by a
lack of any alternatives or even counterforces to the ruling party. If the
minimum criterion for a democratie election process is an opportunity for
citizens to make a political choice, one can say that in Zimbabwe the 1995
elections were the least democratie during its independence. The ruling party,
the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front), ZANU(PF), actually
'won' a majority in the parliament even before the elections starled. Since
only 65 seats were actually contested out of the 120 seats open for
competition and since the president also has the right to appoint 30 MPs,
including the eight provincial governors and ten seats reserved for chiefs, all
of whom in practice are supporters of ZANU(PF), the ruling party was
ensured 85 seats out of the total 150 before the election. Interestingly enough,
important organisations of civil society, such as the labour unions and
representatives of the business community, were very reluctant to play any
role in the elections and literally avoided direct involvement with the political
parties, in spite of the fact that African civil society is commonly represented
as an arena for the defence and support of multi-party democracy.
This notion of African civil society sterns from the fact that in the fïrst half
of the 1990s business communities and labour unions were prominently
linked to regime transitions from authoritarian rule to contested elections.
Michael Bratton, for instance, concluded in a recent study that '[i]n countries
with pluralistic labor movements ... industrial action was at the center of mass
uprising and the trade unions helped provide an organisational infrastructure
for Opposition movements'. Similarly, according to the same study,
an active business community plays a part in the onset of regime
transitions. The often minuscule business class in African countries
Liisa Laakso, University of Helsinki, Finland.
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